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Abstract: We examine  how U.S. monetary  policy  affects  the  international  activities  of U.S.  banks. We 
access a rarely studied U.S. bank‐level regulatory dataset to assess at a quarterly frequency how changes 
in  the U.S.  Federal  funds  rate  (before  the  crisis)  and quantitative easing  (after  the onset of  the  crisis) 








In  today’s  globally  interconnected  financial  system,  the  effects  of  a  central  bank’s  actions  reach  far 





has turned to the  impact of monetary policy on the supply of credit  to borrowers  located abroad. The 
rise  of  global  banks,  i.e.,  banks which  lend  to  borrowers  cross‐border  or maintain  foreign  affiliates  in 
many other countries, over the past two decades has added a sense of urgency to the study of potential 
“global”  bank  lending  channels.  Following  monetary  easing  at  home,  global  banks  can  both  increase 


















their most  efficient  use. With  the  globalization  of  banking,  global  U.S.  banks  now  have  the  ability  to 




banking  systems  of  various  countries.  In  this  paper,  we  add  to  the  literature  by  examining  the 
transmission of U.S. domestic monetary policy to a broad range of other countries, through changes in 
U.S. banks’ cross‐border and affiliate exposures at the host country‐bank level.2 
We are among  the  first  to utilize  the full dimensionality of  the bank‐level Country Exposure reports, a 
































We  construct  a  dataset  on  globally  active  U.S.  financial  institutions’  domestic  and  foreign  activities 
between 2003 and 2016, and study how changes in the stance of U.S. monetary policy (as measured by 
changes  in  the Federal  funds  rate  in  the pre‐crisis, and  in quantitative easing  in  the post‐crisis period) 




the  hypothesis  that  deposit‐funding  constrained  or  less  capitalized  global  U.S.  banks  (henceforth 









evidence  that  unconventional  monetary  policy  (quantitative  easing)  in  the  post‐crisis  period,  as 





4 Kashyap and Stein (2000)  focus on bank  liquidity and size, but the ensuing  literature has shown that the (core) 






border  expansionary  effect  of  quantitative  easing  are  also  present  when  studying  maturity  or  target 
sector‐specific credit flows. Finally, we show that cross‐border flows to lower income countries fluctuate 
more  in response to changes  in U.S. monetary policy  in  the pre‐crisis period.5 Our  results also suggest 
that  U.S.  banks’  foreign  affiliate  flows  are  significantly  affected  by  the  bank  lending  channel  of  host 
country monetary  policy  in  the  pre‐crisis  period.  Host  country monetary  changes  affected  global  U.S. 
banks’  foreign  subsidiaries  significantly more  than U.S. branches abroad.6 However,  the  stance of U.S. 
monetary policy has no significant impact on these affiliate flows. We also benchmark our specifications 
to  those  of  Kashyap  and  Stein  (2000)  by  studying  monetary  transmission  into  U.S.  banks’  domestic 
lending  flows.  Our  results  suggest  that  the  domestic  bank  lending  channel may  have  intensified  over 
time.  Finally,  in  auxiliary  estimations  we  find  that  U.S  monetary  policy  may  also  affect  U.S.  banks’ 
decision to enter new host markets in the pre‐crisis period. 
Our four main contributions to this literature are as follows.7 First, using our unique bank‐level data on 
bilateral  foreign exposures we document  the significant  impact of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. banks’ 
cross‐border  flows  via  external  capital  markets,  i.e.,  to  non‐affiliated  parties  abroad.  These  results 
complement previous results on the existence of the bank lending channel in U.S. banks’ internal capital 
markets  abroad  (Cetorelli  and  Goldberg  (2012a))  and  U.S.  banks’  foreign  affiliate  lending  abroad 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a); Morais et al. (2017)). Distinguishing these various channels is important, 
since  the  diversification  benefits  (the  return‐risk  tradeoffs)  that  global  banks  might  incur  from 
                                                            
5 These results on the strength of a cross‐border bank lending channel are economically relevant, since our sample 




7  Inspired by  Correa  and Murry  (2009),  and  in  addition  to  these  four  contributions, we  further differ  from  their 











affiliate  flows  (funded  by  internal  capital  transfers),  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  be  informationally 
opaque with greater monitoring requirement, country risk and transfer risk. Given these differences, we 
expect  that  the  transmission  of  monetary  policy  changes  into  cross‐border  flows  differs  from  how 
internal  transfers  or  foreign  affiliate  flows  are  affected  by  such  changes.  Our  results  confirm  our 
hypothesis. 
Second,  our  bilateral  financial  claims  data  at  the  bank‐host  country‐maturity  and  bank‐host  country‐
sector level allows us to directly control for changes in conditions that are likely to affect the demand for 









on  the  lending of U.S. banks  through  foreign affiliates. We study  the  impact of quantitative easing on 
cross‐border  flows  while  carefully  controlling  for  changes  in  time‐varying  demand‐side  conditions 








Finally,  we  refine  our  results  on  the  strength  of monetary  transmission  across  several  bank  and  host 
country  characteristics.  To  our  knowledge,  we  are  first  to  examine  the  roles  of  the  scope  of  foreign 
exposure  of  banks,  together with  the  income  level  and dollarization  of  host  countries  in  this  context. 






the estimation,  including an examination of  the period after  the onset of  the  financial  crisis when the 











a. The maturity of cross‐border  flows, as short‐term flows are easier to adjust  in  response to 
changes in monetary conditions, relative to longer‐term investments. 
b. The target sector of lending and the income level of host countries, as the financial and non‐
bank  private  sectors  and  investments  in  lower  income  countries  offer  a  wider  range  of 
return‐risk  opportunities  (compared  to  lending  to  the  public  sector  or  higher  income 
countries, respectively). 
2. A  tightening  (loosening)  in  the  host  domestic  monetary  conditions,  captured  by  an  increase 
(decrease)  in  the host  short‐term  interest  rate,  reduces  (expands)  local  lending by U.S.  banks` 
affiliates, especially by constrained banks with  low deposit  to assets or capital  to assets ratios. 
The effect is particularly strong for lending: 
a. By banks’ subsidiaries  in the host country, which have more direct access to  local  financial 
markets. 
Our main  specification  describes  U.S.  banks’  quarterly  cross‐border  flows  as  follows.  Let  , ,   denote 
bank  j’s  holdings  of  cross‐border  claims  in  host  country  i  at  time  t.  The  superscript  n denotes  either 
target  sector  (financial,  private  non‐bank,  or  public)  or  maturity  of  the  claim,  depending  on  the 
breakdown of  the data  for  a  specific  estimation. Then  ln ,,   captures  the quarterly  change  (from 
time  t‐1  to  time  t) of  the natural  logarithm of  the cross‐border bank claims of maturity or  sector n of 
bank j into host country i. Our specification is as follows: 
(1) ln ,, ∑ ∑ , ∑ , 	 ,	 , 	 ,,  













expenses  to  total  assets  (“expense  ratio”).  In  addition, Bank  Controls  contains  a  Selection  Correction 
term  to  control  for  the  sample  selection  bias  due  to  the  fact  that  the  dependent  variable  ln   is 
observed  for only a select group of globally active U.S. banks, as  further explained  in  the Data section 
below. Lastly, Demand Controls contains various combinations of bank, host country, time and sector or 
maturity fixed effects to control for changes in demand‐side conditions. 
We also  examine  financial  flows of U.S.  banks’  foreign  affiliates, which  can  also be  considered  “local” 
bank  flows  because  the  affiliate  has  a  local  presence  in  the  foreign  country.  Let  ,   denote  bank  j’s 
holdings of local claims in host country i at time t. Then  ln ,  captures the quarterly (from time t‐1 
                                                            
8  Changes  in  U.S.  monetary  policy  are  exogenous  to  credit  conditions  abroad,  eliminating  concerns  about  a 
feedback effect from foreign credit conditions to monetary policy changes. Given our identification strategy we are 
not  concerned  about  potential  domestic  macroeconomic  feedback  effects  into  monetary  policy  (Acharya  et  al. 
(2016)).  Indeed, we  identify monetary  transmission  from  the differential  response of  funding‐constrained versus 
funding‐abundant  banks  to  changes  in  monetary  policy.  Even  if  macro  shocks  simultaneously  impact  all  banks’ 
flows through monetary policy, the cross‐bank differences in the strength of transmission should not be impacted. 
9 Our use of  lagged values of the bank funding ratios ensures that these ratios may at most reflect past strategic 










to time t) bank flows of bank  j’s foreign affiliate  in host country  i. Equation (2) describes our empirical 
specification. 
(2) ln , ∑ ∑ ,  
∑ , 	 , 	 ,  
In addition to the variables described for Equation (1) above, Equation (2) also contains the host country 
i monetary policy measure   and its interaction with the funding ratio  , .11 This monetary measure is 
defined as the quarterly change in the host country i short‐term base interest rate (the local equivalent 
of  the  Fed  funds  rate).  The  vector  Demand  Controls  contains  various  combinations  of  bank,  host 
country12 and time fixed effects, as well as host country macro controls in some specifications.13 We also 
include  a  Selection  Correction  term  to  control  for  the  sample  selection  bias  due  to  the  fact  that  the 




lending  channel  of  U.S.  monetary  policy  focuses  on  the  sign  of  the  cumulative  coefficients  on  the 
interaction term of the bank’s funding ratio and the U.S. monetary policy change: ∑  and ∑ . If 




















Our main dependent variables are  the bilateral  cross‐border and  foreign affiliate bank  flows described 
above.  These  variables  are  derived  from  quarterly  bank‐level  data  on  U.S.  banks’  cross‐border  and 
foreign  affiliate  claims  from  the  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council  (FFIEC)'s  009  Data 




claims  in near 120 host  countries  and  territories, with quarterly  frequency over  the  2003:Q1‐2016:Q4 
period. Cross‐border  claims and  foreign affiliate  claims are  reported  separately  for each host  country‐
bank‐time  (i.e.,  year:quarter)  combination.15  For  each  bilateral  bank‐host  country  pair,  we  use  cross‐
border claims data delineated by remaining maturity (short‐term with maturity  less than one year and 














composition of  claims over  time we  augment  the  009  reports with  information  from  the Call  Reports 
data aggregated across all U.S. global banks. Over our sample period,  loans,  leases and repos made up 
over 40 percent of U.S. banks’ cross‐border claims (near 23 percent to the private sector, 5 percent to 
banks,  remainder  to governments). Deposits with  foreign banks made up around 15 percent of  cross‐







bank  affiliates  in  Asian  countries  is  8,  while  this  number  is  smaller  in  Eastern  Europe  (5  U.S.  banks). 




























an  average  of  1  percent  of  a  U.S.  bank’s  cross‐border  portfolio,  but  this  share  reaches  as  high  as  70 
percent  for  some bank‐country pairs.  The number of  foreign  countries  a U.S.  bank holds  cross‐border 
claims in ranges from 1 to over a hundred, with a median of over 30 countries. About one‐eighth of our 
                                                            
17  Using  the  classification  of  the  World  Bank,  available  at: 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519‐world‐bank‐country‐and‐lending‐groups. 
18 In order to avoid the confounding effect of investment considerations unrelated to monetary policy, we exclude 
U.S.  banks’  foreign  claims  on  offshore  centers  and  tax  havens.  Absent  this  exclusion,  the  share  of  cross‐border 






the global U.S.  banks which also hold  local  (affiliate)  claims  in host  countries,  the number of  affiliate‐
active  countries  ranges  from 1  to over 90, with a median of 19  countries. About  three‐fourths of U.S. 
banks’ foreign affiliate claims are denominated in host countries’ local currencies in the pre‐crisis period. 
We  find  that 40  countries  can be  categorized  as  “low dollarized” hosts  for  at  least  a quarter or more 
before  the  crisis,  that  is,  receiving U.S. bank affiliate  flows  that are at  least 60 percent  local  currency‐
denominated. 
b. Data	on	U.S.	banks’	balance	sheet	and	financial	conditions	




Selection  Correction  statistic  from probit  regressions  of  a  bank’s  globally  active/non‐active  status  (for 





banks  left  in  our  sample.  Moreover,  there  are  26  global  banks  in  our  sample  which  maintain  5  or  more  host 
countries  in their portfolio at all times throughout our sample. As will become clear below, we demonstrate that 
our results are robust to removing the “specialized” banks from our sample. 
20  Call  Reports  data  are  reported  on  the  FFIEC  Central  Data  Repository’s  Public  Data  Distribution  site  (for 
commercials banks), on the FR Y‐9C forms on the Chicago Fed’s website (for bank holding companies) and on the 
FR 2886b and FFIEC 002 forms (for Edge and Agreement Corporations). 





Equation  (1).  We  correct  for  this  bias  by  calculating  the  selection  error  correction  statistic  from  the  globally 
active/non‐active probit regression, and including this statistic in our estimation of Equation (1). Similarly, there is a 






also  include  a  set  of  host  country macroeconomic  characteristics  to  control  for  host  country‐specific 
time‐variant changes in credit demand conditions. We focus on the following set of controls: Quarterly 
changes in the host country’s short‐term interest rate, in the local currency‐USD exchange rate, and the 
host  country’s  real  GDP.22 We  collect  data  on  these  variables  from  the  EIU's  Country  Data,  the  IMF’s 
International  Financial  Statistics,  and OECD's  Statistics.  Data  on  the U.S.  Fed  funds  rate  and  the  Fed’s 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities come from the website of the Federal Reserve. The dataset on post‐







the  Fed  Funds  rate  remained near  the  zero  lower bound  as  expansionary monetary  policy  continued. 
From then on, the shadow interest rate increased and turned positive again as the Fed funds rate started 




bias  by  estimating  a  probit  regression  of  banks’  foreign  affiliate  presence  choices,  then  including  the  calculated 
selection correction statistic in the estimation of Equation (2). 















banks  the  equivalent  potency  of  the  domestic  transmission  mechanism.  We  further  examine  the 
robustness of the cross‐border channel in Table 5 by using the sector‐specific version of our cross‐border 










changes  and  their  interactions with  banks’  funding  constraint measure. We  also  repeat  Column 1  of  each  table 
including  four  lags  of  the  level  of  monetary  changes  only,  and  find  that  the  significance  of  the  cumulative 







flows  in  the  2003:Q1‐2008:Q3  period.24  As we move  from  Column  1  to  4,  we  include  an  increasingly 
exhaustive  set  of  fixed  effects  to  control  for  non‐monetary  policy‐related  changes  and  unobservable 
factors. While Table 2 shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of the most extensive set of fixed 
effects at the time – host country – maturity  level  (Column 11), we gradually build up our set of  fixed 
effects so that we can examine the role of a broader set of explanatory variables.25 
Importantly, the coefficients on the interaction of the change in the U.S. Fed funds rate and the bank’s 









24  Standard  errors  on  the  cumulative  coefficients  across  the  four  lags  of  included monetary  policy  changes  are 
calculated  using  the  delta method. We  cluster  standard  errors  at  the  host  country  –  bank  level  in  Table  2.  The 
significance levels of the coefficients are robust to clustering at the bank level. 
25 For  instance,  including time – host country – maturity  fixed effects  in all  specifications would prevent us  from 
including the levels of the U.S. monetary policy changes or host country macro controls throughout. 
26  These  results  are  robust  to  replacing  the  deposit  to  asset  ratio with  banks’  commitments  ratio  (Correa  et  al. 












transmission  effects  from  variation  within  such  pairs  over  time.  Our  transmission  results  remain 
significant even when we include these fixed effects. 28 
As mentioned  above,  about  one‐eighth  of  observations  in  the  sample  come  from U.S.  banks  that  are 
specialized  lenders,  i.e.,  hold  cross‐border  claims  in  4  or  fewer  countries.  We  take  further  steps  to 
exclude  the  possibility  that  these  banks  in  the  sample may  bias  our  results,  since  the  bilateral  cross‐
border flows of these specialized banks may be strongly affected by historical, cultural or ownership ties 
(Paravisini  et al.  (2014)). Therefore,  in Columns 5  through 11 we  focus our attention on multi‐country 
lenders  with  5  or  more  bilateral  cross‐border  relationships.  We  find  that  the  coefficient  on  the 
interaction of bank  funding  ratio and changes  in U.S. monetary policy  remains highly  significant,  even 
when we  include  time  – host  country  –  credit maturity  fixed  effects  to  fully  control  for  unobservable 





In  Columns  12  and  13,  we  examine  how  our  results  on  the  presence  of  an  active  international  bank 
lending  channel may  vary  depending on  the maturity of  cross‐border  flows. We expect  that quarterly 
changes  in monetary  policy  have  a  stronger  impact  on  short‐term  flows  than  long‐term  flows,  as  the 
former are easier to adjust depending on funding conditions. Indeed, the coefficient on the interaction of 













more  to  a  100  basis  points  dip  in  the  Fed  funds  rate  than  the  flows  of  their  funding‐abundant 
counterparts.  This  result  is  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  time  –  host  country  fixed  effects  to  control  for 
unobservable changes in credit demand. The coefficient on long‐term flows, however, is insignificant and 
very  small  in  magnitude.  The  significant  monetary  tightening‐induced  reduction  in  short‐term  cross‐
border flows before the crisis may reflect a pattern of “retreating to home” in response to contractionary 
U.S. monetary policy on the external margin, parallel to the internal margin “retreating to home” pattern 
which  Cetorelli  and  Goldberg  (2012b)  document.  Indeed,  in  line  with  this  explanation,  in  auxiliary 
regressions we  find  that pre‐crisis  contractionary U.S. monetary policy  lead U.S. banks  to  increase  the 
relative  share  of  short‐term  domestic  loans  while  they  reduced  the  relative  prevalence  of  short 
maturities in their cross‐border flows.29 
In Table 3, we repeat  the same specifications as  in Table 2 using the capital  ratio as our measure of a 
bank’s  ability  to  obtain  outside  funding.30  These  results  also  show  convincing  evidence  of  an 
international  bank  lending  channel  in  cross‐border  flows. On  average,  the monetary policy  effects  are 
somewhat greater in magnitude than those we obtained using the deposit to asset ratio as the funding 
constraint measure. While the full‐sample specifications in Columns 1 through 4 also show consistently 
significant monetary  transmission  effects,  the monetary  policy  coefficients  increase  in magnitude  and 
significance when we eliminate specialized lender banks from our sample in Columns 5 through 11. 
These results indicate that a 100 basis points rise in the U.S. Fed funds rate significantly reduces bilateral 
cross‐border  lending  flows,  and  this  impact  is  significantly  higher  for  less‐capitalized  U.S.  banks. 
Depending on the specification, a 100 basis points hike in the Fed funds rate causes a 3 to 4 percentage 
                                                            
29 Our  result on  the  increasing  share  of  short‐term maturity  flows  (relative  to  longer‐term  flows)  in  response  to 
tightening U.S. monetary policy are in line with the findings of Black and Rosen (2008) and Morais et al. (2017). 
30 We  also  estimate  the  Table  2  specifications  using  bank  size  (total  assets)  as  a measure  of  a  bank’s  access  to 









similar  result  as  in  Table  2,  further  corroborating  the  external‐margin  substitution  story  we  outlined 
above:  Short‐term  flows  exhibit  a  much  stronger  response  to  monetary  changes  than  do  long‐term 
investments. The coefficient on the interaction of the change in monetary policy and the capital ratio is 








In Columns 1  through 4 we  include only  the globally  active banks  (that  is, banks which  report  foreign 
exposures), and  in Columns 5 and 6 we examine all U.S. banks (many of which are only  lending  in the 
U.S.). 


















an  average  effect  of  0.17.  Overall,  comparing  our  results  to  those  of  Kashyap  and  Stein  (2000)  and 
Cetorelli  and Goldberg  (2012a), we  conclude  that  the  strength of  the bank  lending  channel may have 
slightly increased from the 1980s and 1990s into the 2000s. 
It  is  also  interesting  to  compare  the  strength  of monetary  transmission  into  global  U.S.  banks’  cross‐
border flows (as shown in Table 2) with the transmission into their domestic flows in Columns 1 through 
4  in  Table  4.  The domestic monetary  effects  in  Table 4  appear much  smaller  than what we  found  for 
cross‐border  flows. These  relative magnitudes are  in  line with earlier  results on  the higher potency of 
cross‐border monetary transmission, as in Aramonte et al. (2015) and Célérier et al. (2016).  
However,  it  is  difficult  to  compare  these  coefficients  with  those  in  the  previous  tables,  since  the 
magnitudes  of  domestic  claims  are  substantially  greater  than  cross‐border  claims.  Therefore,  even  a 
large absolute change in domestic claims from one quarter to the next may appear smaller in percentage 
terms, and the base of cross‐border lending is often small such that a few additional units of lending may 










differences  reveals  that  the  differential  impact  of  a  change  in  U.S.  monetary  policy  on  funding‐
constrained vs. funding‐abundant global banks’ cross‐border flows is about 0.11 standard deviations. The 





































significance)  in  lending  to  the  banking  sector,  followed  by  lending  to  the  non‐bank  private  sector.  As 
expected, the monetary transmission effects are negligible in lending to the public (sovereign) sectors of 
foreign countries. Overall, the results in Tables 2 through 5 demonstrate a robust relationship between 
changes  in  U.S. monetary  policy  and  cross‐border  flows.  The  stronger  impact  for  funding‐constrained 
banks is consistent with a causal role for U.S. monetary policy. 
c. Post‐crisis	period	
Our  analysis  thus  far  has  focused  on  the  time  period  before  the  onset  of  the  financial  crisis  and  the 
pursuant recession. In Table 6, we examine the presence of the international bank lending channel in the 
2008:Q4‐2016:Q4 period, which we refer  to as  the “post‐crisis” period.35 Our dataset extends  through 
                                                            












Two  important  complications  in  studying  the  post‐crisis  period  in  U.S.  banks’  global  activities  are  the 
presence  of  aggregate  shocks  which  simultaneously  affected  the  demand  and  supply  sides  of 
international financial  flows, and the observation that the Fed funds rate became less  indicative of the 
stance of U.S. monetary policy.  First,  the quick  contagion of  the  financial  crisis  across  institutions  and 
borders caused leftward shifts in the supply of credit. Soon thereafter, the real economic effects brought 
on by the drying‐up of liquidity led to leftward shifts of the world‐wide demand for credit as well, while 
central  banks  around  the world  engaged  in  aggressive  expansionary  policy  to  fend  off  these  negative 
economic  effects.  To  sum  up:  Substantial  interest  rate  declines  coincided with  large  decreases  in  the 
volume of bank credit. 
In our Table 6 analysis of  the 2008:Q4‐2016:Q4 period, we  rely on an extensive set of  fixed effects  to 
separate  these  aggregate  shocks  from  changes  in  flows  brought  on  by  monetary  easing.  In  all  our 
specifications, we include bank controls, host country – bank – maturity or host country – bank – sector 
fixed  effects  and  time  fixed  effects.  Furthermore,  as  before,  we  include  four  lagged  values  of  our 
monetary measures and present cumulative marginal effects in Table 6. 
The second issue to tackle  is  that, having reached the zero  lower bound, the Fed funds rate became a 
less  indicative  measure  of  monetary  policy  after  the  onset  of  the  crisis.  At  end‐2008,  the  Fed’s 
expansionary efforts sent the effective Fed funds rate below 25 basis points. This policy rate remained at 





of  U.S.  monetary  policy  over  the  2008:Q4‐2015:Q4  period.  Therefore,  we  examine  two  alternate 
measures of the stance of U.S. monetary policy for our post‐crisis analysis. 
First,  we  employ  Krippner  (2016)’s  shadow  short‐term  interest  rate  in  place  of  the  Fed  funds  rate 





Using  Krippner  (2016)’s  shadow  short‐term  rate  as  our  measure  of  monetary  policy  in  the  first  four 






















basis  points  change  in  the  base  interest  rate  –  which  corresponds  to  an  approximately  1.5  standard 
deviations change in the case of the short‐term shadow interest rate. For consistency, we define a unit 
change  in  the Fed’s sale of securities as a 1.5 standard deviations change  in this measure as well. This 
corresponds  to  an  approximately  15  percentage  points  change  in  this  variable.  While  there  is  no 
evidence of substantial monetary transmission  in  the maturity‐breakdown data  (Columns 5 and 6), we 
find some evidence of monetary transmission in the sector‐specific data (Column 7). Using the deposit to 
asset  ratio  as  our  measure  of  bank  funding,  we  find  that  funding‐constrained  banks  increase  their 
bilateral cross‐border  flows  in response to a 15 percentage points expansion  in the Fed’s purchases of 
Treasury  securities  (quantitative easing)  by 0.9  percentage points more  than  funding‐abundant banks. 
This result is significant at the 1 percent level, even after saturating the model with bank balance sheet 
controls, as well as host country – bank – sector and time fixed effects.40 However, similar to using the 
short‐term  shadow  rate,  using  the  Fed’s  purchases  of  Treasure  securities  as  a  measure  of  monetary 
expansion we also conclude that transmission into cross‐border lending has been weaker and less robust 
in the post‐crisis era than in the pre‐crisis period. 















First,  the  findings  of  Avdjiev  et  al.  (2017)  suggest  that  higher  pre‐crisis  capitalization  corresponds  to 






more  sensitive  to  changes  in  monetary  policy  before  the  crisis,  and  U.S.  banks  have  shifted  their 
exposures  away  from  riskier  countries  over  our  sample  period  towards  less  risky  hosts.  This 








several  reasons.  From banks’  perspective,  lower  income  countries  contribute  a  different  return  –  risk 







might  undertake  through  increased  lending  to  lower  income  host  countries  makes  income‐specific 




Furthermore,  the  inflows  from  foreign  banks may  induce  lower  income  countries  to  offer  particularly 
hospitable regulatory treatment to banks providing such inflows (Temesvary (2017)). 
In  Table 7, we  report  results  from  several  specifications  in which we  interact our dummy variable  for 
lower  income  countries  (below  the  median  income  per  capita  in  the  given  time  period)41  with  U.S. 
monetary policy measures. Columns 1 and 2 replicate the specifications in Column 4 from Tables 2 and 3 




U.S.  banks’  cross‐border  lending  to  lower  income  countries  is  significantly  stronger  than  into  higher 











the  cross‐border  lending  of  low‐capitalized  U.S.  banks  to  lower  income  countries  by  3.4  to  7.3 
percentage points more than the lending of higher‐capitalized banks.42 
Our hypothesis  is  that cross‐border flows to  lower  income countries would be  impacted more strongly 
because  of  a  different  risk‐return  tradeoff  in  those  countries.  To  examine  this  explanation,  we  also 
calculate country‐risk adjusted market returns for each host country in our sample.43 Doing so, we find 




in  the  strength of monetary  policy  transmission  into  lower  vs.  higher  income host  countries.  Studying 




addition, as discussed  in Section 4.c. above,  the gradual shift of U.S. banks’ cross‐border  lending away 
from riskier (lower income) host countries over our sample period may also be a contributing factor. 
e. Affiliate	flows	



















Furthermore,  because  our  local  flows  data  incorporates  claims  by  affiliates  who  operate  as  fully 









inherent  in  selective  reporting,  and  an  increasingly  exhaustive  set  of  demand  and  supply‐side  fixed 
effects. 
In our full sample specifications  in Columns 1 through 4, we find evidence that host country monetary 
policy matters,  but  no  support  for  a  role  for  U.S. monetary  policy  in  determining  U.S.  banks’  foreign 
affiliate flows. The direct impact of an increase in host country short‐term interest rates on local flows is 







is  around 4 percentage points greater  for  low‐capitalized U.S.  banks’  affiliates  than  for  those of  high‐
capitalized U.S.  banks.45  These  effects  are  economically  relevant  given  that  the  average  affiliate  flows 
were  equal  to  1.4  percent  during  the  pre‐crisis  period  (with  a  standard  deviation  of  11.5).  The 
significance and magnitude of the difference between the funding‐constrained vs. unconstrained banks` 
monetary effects remains high even after we saturate our model with host country – bank and time fixed 
effects.  The  coefficients  on  both  the  levels  and  interactions  of  U.S.  monetary  policy  changes  are 
insignificant in all our Table 8 specifications. 
We  expect  that  the  host  country  monetary  policy  effects  are  particularly  strong  in  those  foreign 









in  individual  host  countries,  and  own  related  offices  in  other  countries.48  Repeating  the  Table  8 
                                                            
45 A 100 basis points change in host country interest rates corresponds to a 1.25 standard deviation change. 












The  mode  of  a  global  U.S.  bank’s  entry  into  a  host  country  can  also  have  important  effects  on  the 
strength of monetary transmission. Subsidiaries of U.S. banks  in  foreign countries are  locally chartered 
and  able  to  draw  on  local  funding  sources  (deposits  and  central  bank  liquidity  in  the  host  country). 
Affiliations without a  local charter  (such as branches), on  the other hand, constitute a weaker  form of 
host  country  presence  in  that  these  offices  are  dependent  on  parent  bank  funding  and  have  limited 
access  to  local  liquidity  sources. Therefore, we expect  that  the  transmission of host country monetary 







Our  results  in  Table  9  confirm  our  hypothesis:  the  transmission  of  host  country  monetary  policy  is 
stronger into the local lending flows of U.S. banks’ subsidiaries. The Table 9 results reveal that the triple 
interaction  of  host  country  monetary  policy  changes,  funding  ratios  and  the  subsidiary  indicator  is 
significant in six specifications, with coefficients in the 5.45 to 9.45 range. These results suggest that the 












U.S. banks  in Mexico, while Coleman et al.  (2014)  find that even  the  flows of non‐U.S. affiliate private 
banks in Brazil are affected by U.S. monetary policy. We can point to three potential sources as to the 
discrepancy of our results. First, we saturate our specifications with increasingly exhaustive sets of fixed 




therefore  indicate that the authors’  findings  (specific  to  lending  in Mexico and Brazil) may not be  fully 
generalizable.  Second, we  include  in  our  specifications  changes  in  the  host  country’s monetary  policy 
rate, both  in  its  level and  interaction with the bank funding ratio. To the extent that foreign monetary 
policy  rates move together with U.S. policy rates, previous work’s  findings on the significant  impact of 
U.S. monetary policy on local flows might have been partly due to an omitted variable problem. The third 





of  U.S.  banks  via  external  capital  markets  between  2003  and  2016.  Specifically,  we  examined  how 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
repeat the Table 9 regressions interacting the U.S. and host country monetary policy measures with a net due to 







and quantitative  easing beyond)  affected U.S.  banks’  bilateral  cross‐border  and  foreign  affiliate  flows. 
Using the identification strategy that funding‐constrained banks exhibit a stronger response to changes 
in liquidity conditions than their unconstrained peers, we find strong evidence that U.S. monetary easing 
significantly  increased  the  bilateral  cross‐border  flows  of  U.S.  banks  in  the  pre‐crisis  period,  and  this 
effect was substantially stronger for constrained banks. We also find some evidence that easing in U.S. 
liquidity conditions in the post‐crisis period was positively related to bilateral cross‐border flows by U.S. 
banks.  Furthermore,  the  impact of  changes  in U.S. monetary policy was  substantially  stronger on U.S. 
banks’ lending to lower income countries before the crisis. We find that U.S. banks’ foreign affiliate flows 
respond to changes  in host country monetary policy, and these  local monetary effects are stronger on 
the  lending  of  locally‐chartered  subsidiaries.  Our  findings  are  robust  to  various  data  specifications, 
funding constraint measures (i.e., deposit or capital to assets ratios) and the inclusion of exhaustive sets 
of  relevant  fixed  effects.  Some  results  suggest  that  U.S. monetary  policy may  have  also  affected U.S. 
banks’ decision to “go global” and to establish affiliate presence in foreign countries. 
Our  contributions  to  the  literature  are  three‐fold.  First,  among  the  few  studies  which  use  the  full 
dimensionality  of  the  detailed  regulatory  Country  Exposure  dataset  on  U.S.  banks’  foreign  claims 
(Berrospide et al.  (2017); Niepmann and Schmidt‐Eisenlohr  (2017)),  to our knowledge our paper  is  the 
first to utilize it to explicitly control for changing conditions in the demand for investment by U.S. banks 
abroad,  thereby  providing  a  clearer  identification  of  the  bank  lending  channel  (Bernanke  and  Gertler 
(1995)).  Second,  to our knowledge our work  is  the  first  to document  the working of  the bank  lending 
channel  through U.S.  banks’  cross‐border  flows  in external capital markets pre‐  and post‐crisis,  i.e.,  to 
non‐affiliated parties abroad. By doing so, our results complement the findings of Cetorelli and Goldberg 
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U.S. Short-term Shadow Rate (%) Fed Funds Rate (%)
Figure 1: U.S. Interest Rates: 2003:Q1-2016:Q4
Sources: Krippner (2016); Federal Reserve
Variable Names Definition Unit N Mean SD Min. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Max.
Dependent Variables
Quarterly Change in Cross-border US Bank Lending
Aggregate (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claimsa in the host country in quarter t
over 2003:Q1-2008:Q3
% 25,470 -0.40 53.08 -277.26 -49.55 -10.57 0 11.31 51.08 219.72
Aggregate (Post-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims in the host country in quarter t over 
% 9,313 -1.48 30.11 -265.21 -21.06 -2.64 0 1.73 18.82 200.37
≤ 1 Year (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims with a remaining maturity below
one year in the host country in quarter t over 2003:Q1-
2008 Q3
% 24,780 10.66 42.46 -153.97 -27.28 0 0 22.99 60.99 164.90
≤ 1 Year (Post-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims with a remaining maturity below
one year in the host country in quarter t over 2008:Q4-
% 44,213 2.98 40.70 -154.55 -37.92 -2.42 0 11.32 46.45 164.85
> 1 Year (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims with a remaining maturity equal to
and above one year in the host country in quarter t over
% 16,775 5.41 29.83 -152.48 0.00 0 0 9.59 26.42 164.79
> 1 Year (Post-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims with a remaining maturity equal to
and above one year in the host country in quarter t over
2008 Q4 2016 Q4
% 8,904 2.34 27.33 -148.42 -6.46 0 0 2.35 17.78 163.69
To Banks (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims on the host country`s financial
sectorc in quarter t over 2003:Q1-2008:Q3
% 43,872 7.37 46.97 -194.59 -29.95 0 0 16.84 61.60 185.98
To Banks (Post-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims on the host country`s financial
sector in quarter t over 2008:Q4-2016:Q4
% 78,291 1.03 44.51 -194.59 -40.21 0 0 5.75 44.50 186.02
To Non-bank Private Sector (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims on the host country`s non-bank
private sector in quarter t over 2003:Q1-2008:Q3
% 45,022 8.38 39.21 -194.59 -8.07 0 0 17.42 45.06 185.82
To Non-bank Private Sector (Post-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims on the host country`s non-bank
private sector in quarter t over 2008:Q4-2016:Q4
% 54,139 4.19 38.46 -194.59 -22.91 0 0 8.94 38.65 186.02
To Public Sector (Pre-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims on the host country`s public sector
in quarter t over 2003:Q1-2008:Q3
% 45,612 2.69 27.65 -194.59 0.00 0 0 0 17.19 185.92
To Public Sector (Post-crisis) the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of
total cross-border claims on the host country`s public sector
in quarter t over 2008:Q4-2016:Q4
% 71,689 0.44 35.23 -10.03 0 0 0 0 15.26 186.02
Quarterly Change in Global US Bank Domestic Lending in 
the U.S. (Pre-crisis)
Global U.S. Banks the change in the natural logarithm of the global U.S. bank's
stock of domestic (U.S.) claims in quarter t over 2003:Q1-
% 1,940 1.39 11.52 -42.91 -11.21 -3.05 1.39 6.16 13.58 44.93
Table 1
Summary statistics
Domestic U.S. Banks the change in the natural logarithm of the domestic U.S.
bank's stock of domestic (U.S.) claims in quarter t over
2003:Q1-2008:Q3
% 355,374 2.27 10.12 -44.97 -7.85 -2.18 1.66 6.54 13.43 45.00
Quarterly Change in US Bank Affiliate Lending in Other 
Countries (Pre-crisis)
the change in the natural logarithm of the bank's stock of net
foreign affiliate claimsd in the host country in quarter t over
2003:Q1-2008:Q3
% 7,897 0.08 47.71 -386.00 -24.00 -2.00 0 4.00 22.00 387.00
US Bank Maintains Affiliate in Host Country (Pre-crisis) indicator variable that equals 1 if the US bank maintains an
affiliate in the host country at time t, and equals 0 otherwise
0/1 19,641 0.12 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00
Independent Variables
Monetary Variables
US Federal Funds Rate (Pre-crisis) quarterly change in the US federal funds rate over 2003:Q1-
2008:Q3
% 25,768 0.09 0.50 -1.63 -0.31 -0.03 0.03 0.47 0.58 0.58
Δ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate (pre-crisis) quarterly change in the host country's short-term base % 18,976 -0.03 0.82 -5.04 -0.55 -0.09 0 0.17 0.55 4.00
interest rate over 2003:Q1-2008:Q3
Δ US Krippner`s Shadow Short Rate (Post-crisis) quarterly change in the Krippner (2013) US shadow federal
funds rate over 2008:Q4-2016:Q4
% 44,167 -0.07 0.71 -1.74 -0.90 -0.31 -0.05 0.13 0.72 2.09
Δ US Federal Reserve`s Sale of Securities (Post-crisis) quarterly change in the Federal Reserve`s sale of securities
over 2008:Q4-2016:Q4
% 44,609 -5.09 10.67 -37.59 -21.27 -7.12 -0.52 -0.01 0.43 21.80
Bank Variables
Bank Deposits to Assets Ratio bank deposits divided by total assets % 64,862 49.86 19.14 0.45 21.12 40.27 52.58 63.53 71.75 82.42
Bank Capital Ratio bank total equity capital divided by total assets % 61,222 9.50 2.90 0.27 6.66 7.68 9.09 10.91 13.19 18.88
Bank Total Assets the natural logarithm of total bank assets mln. 
USD
66,847 11.08 2.48 1.65 7.21 8.99 11.55 12.97 14.24 14.80
Bank Return On Equity bank net income divided by total equity % 66,787 1.65 5.17 -84.14 -0.10 0.67 2.08 3.34 4.70 42.00
Bank Expense Ratio bank expenses divided by total assets % 66,774 1.18 0.74 0.00 0.60 0.78 1.00 1.32 1.78 7.25
Other Variables
US and Host Country GDP Growth quarterly growth rate of Gross Domestic Product % 7,562 2.13 6.01 -32.67 -4.14 -0.61 2.88 5.74 8.02 18.20
US CPI Inflation quarterly change in the Consumer Price Index % 13,203 0.54 0.45 -1.43 0.08 0.40 0.61 0.78 1.00 1.10
Exchange Rate quarterly change in the nominal exchange rate (expressed as
the host country currency per US dollar)
% 9,577 -0.33 4.28 -11.84 -5.81 -2.75 0.00 1.42 4.98 18.46
Predicted Probability that US Bank Lends Across Borders predicted probability that the US bank lends across borders
(i.e., reports on the FFIEC 009 form), derived from the
probit regression in Appendix Table 1
% 139,260 2.44 15.21 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 100.00
Predicted Probability that US Bank Maintains Affiliate in 
Host Country
predicted probability that the US bank maintains an affiliate
in the host country (i.e., reports non-zero affiliate claims),
derived from the probit regression in Appendix Table 2
% 19,641 12.15 30.69 0 0 0 0.07 0.92 86.90 100.00
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending 
Across Borders
Selection Bias Correction statistic derived from the probit
regression in Appendix Table 1
- 139,260 3.74 0.64 0 3.47 3.68 3.85 3.99 4.11 7.02
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Affiliate 
Presence in Host Country
Selection Bias Correction statistic derived from the probit
regression in Appendix Table 2
- 19,641 3.25 1.49 0 0.24 2.70 3.46 4.17 4.87 7.83
Share of US Dollar-denominated Foreign Affiliate Claims in
Total
ratio of all US banks' US Dollar-denominated foreign
affiliate claims to total foreign affiliate claims in the host
% 6,305 28.29 32.65 0 0 0 14.00 45.00 97.00 100.00
Subsidiary Indicator indicator variable that equals 1 if the foreign affiliate flows
observation comes from a subsidiary of a global US bank in
the host country, and equals 0 otherwise
0/1 5,449 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.00
Lower Income indicator variable that equals 1 if the host country is below
the median GDP per capita across all host countries in that
time period, and equals 0 otherwise
0/1 59,842 0.39 0.49 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note. -- Total Cross-border Claims on an ultimate risk basis are defined as: 2003Q1-2005:Q4: (fcex8580) –[outward risk transfer on banks (fcex8586) + outward risk transfer on public entities (fcex8587) + outward risk transfer on other borrowers
(fcex8588)] + [inward risk transfer to banks (fcex8590) + inward risk transfer to public entities (fcex8591) + inward risk transfer to other sectors (fcex8592)]; post-2005:Q4: sum of fcexc929, fcexc930 and fcexc931. The sectoral breakdown of cross-
border claims consists of risk transfer-adjusted cross-border claims on banks (fcex8577-fcex8586+fcex8590 over 2003Q1-2005:Q4; fcexc929 post-2005:Q4), public entities (fcex8578-fcex8587 +fcex8591 over 2003Q1-2005:Q4; fcexc930 post-2005:Q4)
and other sectors (fcex8579-fcex8588 +fcex8592 over 2003Q1-2005:Q4; fcexc931 post-2005:Q4). The maturity breakdown of cross-border claims consists of cross-border claims with remaining maturity of one year or less (cexa5221 for FFIEC 009a
reporters; risk-transfer adjusted fcex8581 over 2003Q1-2005:Q4 and fcexc921 post-2005:Q4 for 009a-non-reporters), and with remaining maturity over one year (cexa5222 for FFIEC 009a reporters; risk-transfer adjusted (fcex8670+fcex8584) over
2003Q1-2005:Q4 and (fcexc915+fcexc916+fcexc917+fcexc918+fcexc919+fcexc920)-fcexc921) post-2005:Q4 for 009a-non-reporters). Foreign affiliate claims are Claims on Local Residents (fcex8593; fcexa339; fcex932; fcexc933; fcexc934; fcexc935).
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]



















Included Maturities All All All All All All All All All All All ≤ 1 Year > 1 Year
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -12.850 -12.610 -11.340 -11.630 -9.176 -11.330
[4.457]*** [4.47]*** [4.669]** [4.694]*** [3.967]** [4.930]**
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Deposits to Assets Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.219 0.218 0.207 0.228 0.201 0.144 0.208 0.174 0.236 0.235 0.158 0.229 0.007
[0.084]*** [0.084]*** [0.088]** [0.090]*** [0.088]** [0.076]* [0.093]** [0.076]** [0.096]*** [0.090]*** [0.081]** [0.107]** [0.132]
Σ Bank Deposits to Assets Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.053 -0.055 -0.015 -0.028 -0.039 -0.039 -0.026 -0.052 -0.048 -0.071 -0.054 -0.068 -0.019
[0.090] [0.090] [0.101] [0.102] [0.092] [0.026] [0.104] [0.027]** [0.106] [0.094] [0.028]* [0.040]* [0.053]
Constant -5.734 -1.369 53.180 25.460 15.020 1.033 51.500 5.190 22.770 -19.910 -2.410 -10.720 11.380
[33.870] [34.090] [37.290] [42.130] [34.670] [3.383] [38.070] [3.826] [42.600] [38.450] [3.571] [5.172]** [5.221]**
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- Yes No -- No -- Yes No No No
Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No -- -- Yes -- -- -- -- Yes -- -- --
Host Country - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No -- -- No Yes -- Yes -- No -- -- --
Host Country - Bank - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes -- -- --
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No -- Yes Yes
Time - Host Country - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No Yes n/p n/p
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.14
Number of Observations 20,782 20,779 20,779 20,779 20,329 20,329 20,329 20,329 20,329 20,329 20,329 12,915 7,414
Table 2
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities for banks with different deposit ratios during the 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one
year). Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Capital-Asset Ratio, Return On Equity and the Expense Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks
Lending Across Borders comes from a probit regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [1]). The Multiple Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or more. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected
for clustering by host country-bank are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates
that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed
effects cannot be included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]



















Included Maturities All All All All All All All All All All All ≤ 1 Year > 1 Year
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -12.990 -12.540 -10.840 -12.460 -14.810 -11.280
[5.685]** [5.684]** [5.927]* [5.785]** [4.760]*** [6.102]*
1.295 1.263 1.116 0.913 1.268 1.518 1.208 1.491 1.276 1.293 1.618 2.450 -0.937
[0.655]** [0.654]** [0.679]* [0.488]* [0.669]* [0.552]*** [0.706]* [0.549]*** [0.730]* [0.681]* [0.569]*** [0.776]*** [1.014]
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.103 0.112 0.350 0.490 -0.038 -0.708 0.221 -0.660 0.254 0.023 -0.669 -0.709 -0.080
[0.501] [0.500] [0.519] [0.533] [0.497] [0.203]*** [0.538] [0.204]*** [0.548] [0.502] [0.215]*** [0.286]*** [0.423]
Constant -1.567 3.073 59.360 46.550 19.280 5.947 58.230 10.160 24.400 -5.967 0.970 -6.038 11.940
[33.710] [33.930] [38.340] [32.010] [34.560] [3.574]* [37.980] [4.032]*** [42.710] [38.740] [3.676] [5.264] [5.308]**
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- Yes No -- No -- Yes No No No
Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No -- -- Yes -- -- -- -- Yes -- -- --
Host Country - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No -- -- No Yes -- Yes -- No -- -- --
Host Country - Bank - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes -- -- --
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No -- Yes Yes
Time - Host Country - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No Yes n/p n/p
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.14
Number of Observations 20,782 20,779 20,779 20,779 20,329 20,329 20,329 20,329 20,329 20,329 20,329 12,915 7,414
Table 3
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities for banks with different capital ratios during the 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a
maturity over one year). Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Expense Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US
Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a probit regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [1]). The Multiple Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or more. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard
errors that are corrected for clustering by host country-bank are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and
significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider
included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects cannot be included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4}
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Bank Ratio Deposits to Assets Deposits to Assets Capital Capital Capital Capital
Sample of Banks Globally Active Globally Active Globally Active Globally Active All US All US
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} 2.045 -1.171 0.448
[3.799] [1.501] [0.219]**
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} -0.024 -0.012 0.235 0.187 0.069 0.074
[0.068] [0.060] [0.080]*** [0.083]** [0.021]*** [0.021]***
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} 0.021 0.019 -0.005 -0.001 0.020 0.023
[0.089] [0.084] [0.066] [0.065] [0.007]*** [0.007]***
Constant 48.260 72.060 47.620 70.950 22.550 23.580
[22.940]** [25.760]*** [18.570]*** [20.980]*** [1.360]*** [1.403]***
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maturity Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Globally Active Bank 1/0 n/p n/p n/p n/p Yes Yes
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09
Number of Observations 1,599 1,599 1,780 1,780 255,426 255,426
Table 4
Quarterly change in domestic US bank lending across maturities for banks with different deposit or capital ratios during the 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in domestic US bank lending across maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year). Table
1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Expense Ratio. The Globally Active Bank dummy is defined as 1 if the bank maintains cross-
border operations in addition to operating in the US, and 0 otherwise. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by bank are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates
that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not
included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects cannot be included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -7.208 -7.341 -7.154 -9.341 -9.720 -9.537
[2.746]*** [2.757]*** [2.888]*** [3.551]*** [3.591]*** [3.751]***
0.104 0.104 0.102 0.146 0.778 0.808 0.800 1.104 2.894 0.728 0.107
[0.051]** [0.051]** [0.053]* [0.053]*** [0.405]** [0.407]** [0.425]* [0.417]*** [0.970]*** [0.429]* [0.184]
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} -0.024 -0.021 -0.023 -0.067 0.058 0.056 0.048 0.027 -0.158 0.702 -0.613
[0.049] [0.049] [0.052] [0.052] [0.268] [0.268] [0.278] [0.270] [0.609] [0.418]* [0.274]**
Constant 55.060 51.230 55.540 13.370 66.750 63.100 67.190 26.340 16.350 -57.410 92.390
[20.500]*** [20.650]*** [21.530]*** [23.020] [20.160]*** [20.230]*** [21.090]*** [22.700] [48.120] [41.570] [26.170]***
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No No -- -- No No -- -- n/p n/p n/p
Host Country - Sector Fixed Effects No No -- -- No No -- -- n/p n/p n/p
Host Country - Bank - Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes n/p n/p n/p
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No No
Time - Host Country - Sector Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No n/p n/p n/p
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13
Number of Observations 59,568 59,559 59,559 59,559 60,840 60,831 60,831 60,831 19,578 20,599 20,759
Table 5
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and sectors for banks with different deposit or capital ratios during the 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and sectors (i.e., the bank sector, the non-bank private sector and the public sector). Table 1
contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Expense Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across
Borders comes from a probit regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [1]). Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by host country-bank are reported in the row below, and the
corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is
included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects cannot be
included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4}














0.097 0.484 -0.010 -0.827
[0.034]*** [0.283]* [0.031] [0.210]***
0.028 -0.001 0.035 -0.081
[0.0288] [0.192] [0.0139]*** [0.0867]
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} 0.116 0.031 0.003 -0.266 1.113 1.611 -0.124 -1.673
[0.060]** [0.245] [0.038] [0.160]* [0.825] [3.333] [0.516] [1.968]
Constant 52.520 23.340 48.660 48.340 25.220 12.840 29.760 41.030
[24.320]** [20.400] [12.580]*** [11.560]*** [24.840] [21.200] [12.740]** [11.110]***
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Host Country - Bank - Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Number of Observations 29,989 31,552 96,372 96,372 29,104 30,660 92,324 96,812
Table 6
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries, credit maturities and sectors for banks with different deposit or capital ratios during the 2008:Q4-2016:Q4 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less than one year
and credit granted with a maturity over one year) in Models [1], [2], [5] and [6] or sectors (i.e., the bank sector, the non-bank private sector and the public sector) in Models [3], [4], [7] and [8]. Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the
summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Expense Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a
probit regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [1]). Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by host country-bank are reported in the row below, and the
corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or
fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Σ US Federal Reserve`s Sale of Securities{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4}
Σ US Krippner`s Shadow Short Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4}
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Bank Ratio Deposits to Assets Capital Deposits to Assets Capital Deposits to Assets Capital Deposits to Assets Capital
Time period 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 2008:Q4-2016:Q4 2008:Q4-2016:Q4 2008:Q4-2016:Q4 2008:Q4-2016:Q4
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Lower Income{t-1 to t-4} -15.830 -36.210 -2.134 -9.570
[9.477]* [12.55]*** [6.518] [5.288]*
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} 0.043 -0.928 0.123 0.300
[0.111] [0.896] [0.0678]* [0.258]
0.294 3.906 0.037 1.034
[0.181]* [1.433]*** [0.115] [0.551]*
5.617 1.071 2.357 -1.535
[4.039] [6.282] [3.652] [4.328]
Σ US Krippner's Shadow Short Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} 0.130 0.573 0.025 -0.734
[0.0433]*** [0.336]* [0.0449] [0.26]***
-0.111 -0.178 -0.040 0.062
[0.0712] [0.603] [0.062] [0.424]
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} -0.024 0.824 -0.081 0.223 0.166 0.120 0.044 -0.411
[0.103] [0.763] [0.0696] [0.28] [0.0717]** [0.303] [0.048] [0.207]**
Σ Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} * Lower Income{t-1 to t-4} 0.041 -0.429 0.031 -0.438 -0.209 -0.292 -0.088 0.237
[0.157] [1.125] [0.0953] [0.452] [0.0977]** [0.474] [0.062] [0.319]
Constant 16.270 64.910 27.940 31.710 54.640 17.290 49.350 50.130
[39.36] [46.8] [30.14] [25.45] [26.62]** [21.91] [14.33]*** [12.01]***
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country - Bank - Credit Maturity Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Host Country - Bank - Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Lending Across Borders Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Number of Observations 20,641 19,522 51,804 54,237 28,355 29,864 83,672 87,754
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending across countries and credit maturities (i.e., credit granted with a maturity less than one year and credit granted with a maturity over one year) in Models [1], [2], [5] and [6], and sectors (i.e.,
the bank sector, the non-bank private sector and the public sector) in Models [3], [4], [7] and [8]. Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Cost Ratio. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing
US Banks Lending Across Borders comes from a probit regression explaining the bank's lending across borders (Appendix Table 1 Model [1]). The Lower Income dummy variable included in its level and interactions indicates countries below the median GDP per capita across host countries in the given time period. Coefficients are listed in the
first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by host country-bank are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that
the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. "n/p" indicates that the set of fixed effects is impossible to include. *** Significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 7
Quarterly change in cross-border US bank lending in lower vs. higher income countries, across credit maturities and sectors for banks with different deposit or capital ratios
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio  * Lower Income{t-1 to t-4}
Σ US Krippner's Shadow Short Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Lower Income{t-1 to t-4}
Σ US Krippner's Shadow Short Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Ratio {t-1 to t-4} * Lower Income{t-1 to t-4}
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]









Σ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate{t-1 to t-4} -20.820 -15.740 -42.220 -35.320
[7.985]*** [8.196]* [20.78]** [17.98]**
Σ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 1.990 1.835 0.348 0.307 4.784 4.625 1.695 2.118
[0.959]** [1.036]* [0.76] [0.763] [2.547]* [2.305]** [1.341] [1.302]*
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -8.459 -17.520
[18.95] [26.44]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.369 -0.486 0.578 0.984 1.530 5.347
[1.745] [1.953] [1.427] [2.438] [2.635] [3.713]
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -4.091 -3.931 -0.279 -0.030 -3.381 -3.226 -1.030 -0.669
[1.847]** [1.887]** [0.526] [0.538] [2.14] [2.667] [1.238] [1.082]
Constant 113.200 -283.400 -44.810 -41.250 212.800 -596.900 -34.660 -32.460
[212] [266] [26.44]* [25.11]* [316.1] [410.8] [30.39] [30.59]
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country Macro Controls Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes -- --
Host Country - Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Time Fixed Effects No Yes -- -- No Yes -- --
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects -- -- Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes
Selection Correction for Observing US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.18 0.31 0.52 0.52 0.17 0.32 0.64 0.64
Number of Observations 2,916 2,916 3,616 3,616 1,301 1,301 1,477 1,477
Table 8
Quarterly change in US bank affiliate lending in other countries for banks with different capital ratios during the 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in US bank affiliate lending in the host country. Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each
included variable. Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Expense Ratio; the Host Country Macro Controls include the lagged quarterly changes in the host country's short term interest rate, the exchange rate and
the host country's GDP. The Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host Country comes from a probit regression explaining the bank's presence in the host country (Appendix Table 2 Model 1). The Multiple Countries sample
includes banks active in five countries or more. The Lowly-Dollarized Countries sample includes host countries for which the share of non-local currency to total US bank lending is below the 40 percentile across all countries that US banks lend to. Coefficients
are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by host country-bank are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated
lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated
set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]









Σ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate{t-1 to t-4} -13.570 -8.800 -13.130 -8.510
[4.503]*** [3.888]** [4.364]*** [3.788]**
Σ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Subsidiary{t-1 to t-4} -65.470 -83.570 -53.080 -43.570 -62.300 -79.510 -52.930 -42.680
[42.71] [44.64]* [36.59] [25.8]* [41.81] [44.62]* [35.86] [24.85]*
Σ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.911 0.794 0.047 0.112 0.817 0.722 0.006 0.065
[0.444]** [0.457]* [0.449] [0.498] [0.411]** [0.44]* [0.429] [0.471]
Σ Host Country Short-Term Interest Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} * Subsidiary{t-1 to t-4} 7.409 9.453 5.595 3.734 7.004 8.942 5.449 3.510
[4.454]* [4.795]** [3.406]* [2.756] [4.323]* [4.784]* [3.279]* [2.668]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -3.961 -12.600
[18.29] [16.77]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Subsidiary{t-1 to t-4} -0.193 12.410 -42.130 1.696 15.080 -39.150
[20.7] [18.58] [20.47]** [20.88] [18.94] [18.78]**
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.837 -1.014 -1.888 0.007 0.138 -0.728
[1.597] [1.985] [2.075] [1.507] [1.722] [1.791]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} * Subsidiary{t-1 to t-4} 2.921 0.389 3.054 2.490 -0.189 2.491
[6.12] [4.928] [2.841] [6.156] [4.967] [2.457]
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -3.589 -2.864 -2.838 -3.586 -3.654 -2.987 -2.943 -3.524
[2.688] [1.979] [2.115] [1.882]* [2.484] [1.923] [2.232] [1.94]*
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} * Subsidiary{t-1 to t-4} -0.278 -0.554 -0.211 -0.525 -0.250 -0.513 -0.151 -0.516
[1.073] [1.172] [0.892] [0.835] [1.096] [1.198] [0.942] [0.868]
Constant 85.040 -326.400 7.958 -112.200 -56.780 -505.400 -134.700 -186.500
[203.9] [220.5] [248.6] [222.7] [198] [167]*** [232.4] [217.7]
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country Macro Controls Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes -- --
Host Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes -- -- Yes Yes -- --
Time Fixed Effects No Yes -- -- No Yes -- --
Time - Host Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection Correction for Observing US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.10 0.23 0.55 0.55 0.11 0.24 0.56 0.56
Number of Observations 2,841 2,841 3,526 3,526 2,794 2,794 3,479 3,479
Note. -- The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in US bank affiliate lending in the host country. Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable.
Bank Controls include the lagged values of Bank Total Assets, Return On Equity and the Expense Ratio; the Host Country Macro Controls include the lagged quarterly changes in the host country's short term interest rate, the exchange rate and the host country's GDP. The
Selection Bias Correction for Observing US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host Country comes from a probit regression explaining the bank's presence in the host country (Appendix Table 2 Model 1). The Multiple Countries sample includes banks active in five countries or
more. The Subsidiary dummy variable included in its level and interactions indicates indicates that the US bank maintains a local presence in the host country via a subsidiary (as opposed to a branch). Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are
corrected for clustering by host country-bank are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is
reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. "--" indicates that the indicated set of characteristics or fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of
fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 9
Quarterly change in US bank subsidiary vs. branch lending in other countries for banks with different capital ratios during the 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 period
Appendix 
Appendix A: Probit estimation of global activity status and foreign market presence 






In  our  examination  of  how  banks’  globally  active  vs.  non‐active  status  depends  on  the  stance  of  U.S. 
monetary policy,  the dependent  variable of  interest  is  an  indicator  that  takes a  value of 1  if  the bank 
operates beyond U.S. borders in the given period, and 0 otherwise. Equation (A.1) describes the probit 
formulation of the bank’s globally active status. 
(A.1)  , ⋀ ∑ ∑ ,  





home  state  and  time  fixed  effects  are  also  included,  depending  on  the  specification.  If  tightening  in 






existence  of  such  an  external  bank  lending  channel  is  that  the  tightening  of  liquidity  conditions  that 
banks experience after contractionary monetary policy might lead them to revise and re‐optimize their 
portfolio with more  focus on domestic  investments. We calculate a Selection Correction  statistic  from 
the estimation of Equation (A.1) and use this variable as a regressor in Equation (1). We do so in order to 







local presence  in host  country  i  at  time  t as  follows. Let  ,   denote an  indicator  variable  that  takes a 
value of 1 if bank j has an affiliate presence in host country i at time t, and 0 otherwise. 
(A.2)  , ⋀ 	ϐ , ∑ ϓ ∑ ,  
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and  the host‐U.S. exchange rate. All  specifications contain host country  fixed effects, and we also add 
                                                            
51 The exclusion restrictions (i.e., variables which are included in the probit estimation but not in the lending flows 











investment  in  that market. The  relative attractiveness of  such additional channels might vary with the 
liquidity  conditions  that  U.S.  banks  experience  at  home. We  calculate  a  Selection  Correction  statistic 
from the estimation of Equation (A.2) and use this variable as a regressor  in Equation (2). We do so  in 
order to control for the selection bias resulting from the fact that we only observe local flows for a select 

















In Table A.1 below, we find that a 100 basis points  increase  in the U.S. Fed funds rate  in the pre‐crisis 
period would have corresponded to a slight decline in the probability of a U.S. bank maintaining global 
operations  in  the  pre‐crisis  period  (the  sample  probability  is  2.4  percent),  and  we  find  no  significant 
difference between  low vs. high‐capitalized banks  in this response. Table A.1 reveals that whether  the 
bank was globally  active  in  the previous period  is a  very  strong predictor of  its  current  globally  active 
status. Bigger and less profitable banks were more likely to be active abroad before the crisis. 
In  Table  A.2,  the  level  effect  of  a  U.S.  monetary  policy  change  is  significant  in  two  of  the  four 
specifications. The  interaction of monetary policy changes with bank capitalization  is  significant  in one 
specification. Therefore, there is some limited evidence that increases in the U.S. Fed funds rate reduces 
the probability that a U.S. bank would be present in a given host country through local operations. These 
effects  remain even after controlling  for host country macro controls and host country and bank  fixed 
effects. However, the strongest predictors of this decision appear to be bank size and whether the bank 









into  a  bank’s  lending  on  the  intensive  margin  is  dependent  on  whether  the  bank  also  maintains  an 
affiliate in the host market that it lends via cross‐border flows. This is because the presence of an affiliate 
enables  the bank  to  respond  to  the U.S. monetary policy  change‐induced scarcity of  liquidity  in  cross‐
border lending by choosing to serve the host market via affiliate flows instead. In additional cross‐border 
flows specifications (available from the authors upon request), we interact the change in U.S. monetary 
policy  and  its  interaction  with  the  bank  funding  ratio  with  an  indicator  of  whether  the  bank  also 
maintains  an  affiliate  in  the  given  host  country  in  that  time  period.  We  find  that  our  monetary 






Table 2 and 3  specifications using banks’  illiquid assets  ratio  (defined as  the  sum of  “loans and  leases 
held for sale”, “net total loans and leases”, “amortized cost of held‐to‐maturity securities” and “fair value 
of available‐for‐sale securities”, divided by total assets) and banks’ commitments ratio (defined as “loan 













affiliates’ net  due  to  shares. Hence  treating net due  to as exogenous  to monetary  conditions, we also 
repeat the Table 9 specifications, interacting the net due to variable with the monetary policy measures 
and  their  interactions  with  the  capital  ratio. We  find  no  evidence  that  net  due  to  shares  impact  the 
strength of monetary transmission into the lending of U.S. banks’ foreign affiliates. 
Delineation  of  by  bank  size. When  we  restrict  our  sample  to  large  global  U.S.  banks  in  our  Table  4 







host  country macroeconomic  demand  controls  (quarterly  changes  in  the  local  currency‐USD exchange 
rate, and the host country’s real GDP) may be endogenous to the host country’s monetary policy. We do 
so by replacing these host country macro variables with one, two, three and four‐quarter forecast values 





Using  affiliate  organizational  information  from  Accuity. While  the  FR  Y‐10  form  is  the most  reliable 
available  source  on  U.S.  banks’  foreign  organizational  structure,  we  also  re‐estimate  our  Table  9 
specifications  using  subsidiary  information  from  Accuity.  Doing  so,  we  find  that  our  Table  9  results 
continue to hold: host country monetary transmission is stronger into the affiliate lending of U.S. banks’ 
subsidiaries. 
Examining  the  role of  carry  trade. A potential  explanation  for why  lower  income countries might  see 
stronger  transmission  is  carry  trade,  as  these  lower  income  countries  offer  higher  interest  rates.  So  a 
lowering of the U.S. Fed funds rate might make these lower income (higher rate) countries appear to be 
a more profitable target for carry trade (and the U.S. more attractive as a carry source). 
To  see  if  this  is  the  case, we  ran  additional  regressions  looking  at  the  potential  role  of  carry  trade  in 
several ways. First, we separate higher vs. lower interest rate countries by replacing the “lower income” 
dummy  in  Table  7  with  a  “high  rate”  dummy,  which  takes  a  value  of  1  if  a  host  country  has money 
market rates above the cross‐country median at a given time, and 0 otherwise. These results show that 
there  is  no  significant  difference  in  the  strength  of  the  transmission  into  high  rate  vs.  low  rate  host 
countries:  carry  trade  does  not  appear  to  be  driving  the  lower  vs.  higher  income  results.  Second, we 
separate carry “target” vs. “source” countries, using two additional variables from the 009 dataset: the 
total borrowing of all  foreign offices of a given bank  from a given host country  (“carry source” =  total 
amount borrowed from a country by the bank), and the total claims of all foreign offices of a given bank 
on  a  host  country  (“carry  target”  =  total  amount  invested  in  a  given  host  country  by  the  bank). We 
categorize countries as “carry target” if the ratio of carry  inflows is high relative to carry outflows, and 
interact  this  “carry  target”  dummy  with  the  monetary  transmission  measures.  We  do  not  see  any 
significant difference in the strength of monetary transmission based on whether the country is a “carry 
trade target” or not. 
Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
US Banks Lending across Borders{t-1} 1.012 1.026 1.012 1.005
[0.104]*** [0.106]*** [0.104]*** [0.103]***
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -0.088 -0.085 -0.088
[0.0479]* [0.0478]* [0.0479]*
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Bank Total Assets{t-1} 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033
[0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]***
Bank Return on Equity{t-1} -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]**
Bank Expense Ratio{t-1} 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.003
[0.004] [0.004]** [0.004] [0.006]
US GDP Growth{t-1} 0.039 0.041 0.039
[0.021]* [0.021]* [0.021]*
US CPI Inflation{t-1} 0.052 0.052 0.052
[0.024]** [0.024]** [0.024]**
Constant -4.922 -5.028 -4.922 -4.638
[0.202]*** [0.204]*** [0.202]*** [0.253]***
Bank Type Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes
Home State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Number of Observations 139,260 141,647 139,172 139,172
Appendix Table 1
US banks lending across borders during the 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates of marginal effects (in percent) from probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a
US bank lends across border in t (year:quarter) and is 0 otherwise. Table 1 contains the definition of all variables and the summary statistics for
each included variable. Marginal effects are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered by bank are reported in the row below, and the
corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and
corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No"
indicates  that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
US Banks Affiliate Presence in Host Country{t-1} 10.970 10.360 12.800 13.490
[0.392]*** [0.446]*** [0.377]*** [0.489]***
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} -6.549 -4.273 -0.461 0.415
[1.142]*** [1.176]*** [1.985] [2.160]
Σ US Federal Funds Rate{t-1 to t-4} * Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} 0.178 0.211 -0.108 0.026
[0.118] [0.116]* [0.214] [0.238]
Σ Bank Capital Ratio{t-1 to t-4} -0.144 -0.151 -1.545 -1.615
[0.042]*** [0.044]*** [0.316]*** [0.370]***
Bank Total Assets{t-1} 0.728 0.755 -15.200 -16.010
[0.086]*** [0.088]*** [2.368]*** [2.726]***
Bank Return on Equity{t-1} 0.504 0.454 -0.761 -0.463
[0.073]*** [0.071]*** [0.228]*** [0.250]*
Bank Expense Ratio{t-1} 0.049 0.077 -8.732 -7.239
[0.165] [0.155] [1.460]*** [1.702]***
Constant -6.585 -7.199 50.740 51.540
[0.457]*** [0.506]*** [7.130]*** [7.911]***
Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Host Country Macro Controls No Yes No Yes
Host Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 16,912 13,867 10,250 7,420
Appendix Table 2
US banks affiliate presence in host countries during the 2003:Q1-2008:Q3 period
Note. -- The table reports estimates of marginal effects (in percent) from probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a
US bank has an affiliate in the host country at time t (year:quarter) and is 0 otherwise. The Host Country Macro Controls include the lagged
quarterly changes in the host country's short-term interest rate, the host country's GDP and the exchange rate. Table 1 contains the definition of
all variables and the summary statistics for each included variable. Marginal effects are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered by
host country-bank are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. Σ indicates that the sum of the
four coefficients on the indicated lag terms (and corresponding standard errors and significance level) is reported. "Yes" indicates that the set of
characteristics or fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is not included. *** Significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
